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Abstract
The interpretation of the loss of utility as transport costs in address mod-
els of differentiation poses a methodological difficulty. Transport costs im-
plicitely amounts to assume that there is a good neither included in the dif-
ferentiated sector nor in the composite (numeraire) good of the economy. We
propose to use iceberg-type transport costs to solve this difficulty.
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1 Introduction.
In this note we tackle the following question: all models of spatial competition
have three essential elements. A set of consumers endowed with (separable) pref-
erences over a differentiated good and a composite homogeneous good (numeraire)
produced under competitive conditions; a set of firms producing different varieties
of the differentiated good, and a function representing the loss of utility borne by a
consumer when unable to buy his best preferred variety. A (popular) reinterpreta-
tion of the model translates the utility loss into transport costs, so that consumers
choose the variety that minimizes the delivered price defined as the sum of the mill
price and the transport cost. This interpretation implicitly assumes that there is an
industry that does not belong to the differentiated sector and is not included in the
composite good. This industry is awkward because its structure is not modeled. It
is not specified how transportation is provided, who the agents are in this industry
or what their objective functions are. Although it represents an appealing way to
study product differentiation, it also contains a methodological issue that has not
been addressed so far.
This “difficulty” also appears in other domains of research, such as urban eco-
nomics (see e.g. Fujita (1995), Abdel-Raman (1994a,b)) or in general equilibrium
models of international trade (see e.g. Krugman (1991, 1992), Helpman and Krug-
man (1988)). Curiously enough, in those areas the way to cope with this issue has
been different. Transport costs are formulated in terms of the transported com-
modity. This modeling was formalized by Samuelson (1954) as “iceberg transport
costs” taking up an idea originated in von Thu¨nen (1930).
Surprisingly enough, up to the authors’ knowledge, there is no contribution in
the literature on spatial competition where transport costs are modeled using the
iceberg transport cost technology. Such formulation means that transport costs are
dependent on market prices. Several interpretations can be put formard. We can
think of the melting phenomenon as a loss of quality, or, in a temporal interpreta-
tion, as a lag between the buying of the commodity and its consumption.
To illustrate our point, in section 3 we propose a monopoly and a general melt-
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ing function. By assuming away competition, we can concentrate in the conse-
quences of modeling transports costs in the iceberg fashion. Next, we apply our
analysis to particular specifications of the melting function. The driving force be-
hind the results is that in contrast with traditional models of spatial competition
where resources devoted to transportation are lost, under the iceberg modeling
these resources are transferred to the firms which, in turn, induces a more elas-
tic demand. Also, given that the resources devoted to transportation are taken into
account in the agents’ optimization behavior, welfare analysis would be meaning-
ful. Section 4 extends the analysis with an illustration of the effects of the melting
function approach in a competitive framework defined by a symmetric duopoly. A
section with conclusion closes the paper.
2 Melting vs. Transport Costs.
Let δ be the distance between consumer x and the firm. We denote by M(δ) the
rate at which the commodity melts away per unit of distance at a distance δ of
the firm. Given M(δ) we have to distinguish between the demand an individual
addresses to a firm from his consumption. Denote by qx(δ) the quantity of the
commodity a consumer located at x ∈ [0, L] needs to buy to consume exactly one
unit of the good. With this notation, we can formally define the melting rate M as,
M(δ) =
∂qx
∂δ
1
qx
.
Finally, denote by µ ∈ (0, 1) a constant positively linked to the melting rate per
unit of distance.
Definition 1 (Generalized melting function). A generalized melting function, h(δ;µ),
specifies the additional demand addressed by an individual located at a distance δ
from the firm to be able to consume one unit of the comodity. It is given by,
h(δ;µ) = qx(δ)− 1, (1)
where
h(δ;µ) > 0,
∂h
∂δ
> 0,
∂h
∂µ
> 0,
∂2h
∂δ2
≥ 0, ∂
2h
∂µ2
≥ 0. (2)
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Figure 1: Delivered prices in a spatial model.
Thus, the melting rate is given by,
M(δ) =
∂h
∂δ
1
1 + h(δ;µ)
.
We could also think of specifying the melting as a function of the distance and the
amount of commodity transported. In this case we would have qx(1 − f(δ;µ)) =
1. However, we can rewrite this latter demand as the former with h(δ;µ) =
f(δ;µ)
1− f(δ;µ) . Therefore, both cases are formally equivalent.
To ease a proper understanding of the role the melting in the modeling, figure 1
illustrates the standard transportation cost and the melting function approaches.
Consider the standard spatial model with convex transport costs. The unit price
at a location x is given by px = p+ tδα, where p denotes the unit f.o.b. price and
α > 1. Note that the slope of px with respect to p is one, so that an increase in p
translates in exactly the same way to all consumers, i.e. the impact is positive but
independent of δ. This situation is depicted in part (a) of figure 1.
The price paid by a consumer located at x according to the proposed general
melting function is given by px = p(1 + h(δ;µ)). We observe that the impact on
px of an increase in p now is a positive function of δ. That is,
∂2px
∂p∂δ
> 0. Also, the
impact on px is increasing with δ. Generically, this situation is presented in part
(b) of figure 1.
In the standard spatial model, a decrease in price increases demand because
the demand is downward sloping with respect to price. When transport costs are
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modeled in the iceberg fashion, a decrease in price has an additional effect on
demand. Demand increases not only because it is negatively related to the price
but because the extra quantity demanded (“transport cost”) is also cheaper. In
other words, demand is more elastic than in the standard spatial model.
3 Analysis.
Consider a spatial market described by a line segment of length L. Consumers are
evenly distributed on the market with unit density. They are identical in all respects
but for their location. A consumer is denoted by x ∈ [0, L]. All consumers have a
common reservation price p. Consumers adjust their demands so that, if positive,
they are able to consume exactly one unit of the commodity.
There is a monopolist in the market located at a distance a from the left end
of the market. It produces a homogeneous product using a constant marginal cost
(zero) technology. Assume, without loss of generality a ≤ L/2.
The assumptions on h(δ;µ) given by (2), imply that the demand addressed by
consumer x given by (1), is a symmetric and increasing function around the firm’s
location and convex in both δ and µ.
The consumers indifferent between buying one unit from the monopolist or
stay out of the market (denote them by z ∈ [0, a] and y ∈ [a, L]) are given by the
solution of the following equations:
p
(
1 + h(a− z;µ)) = p = p(1 + h(y − a;µ)). (3)
A direct inspection of (3), tells us that since ∂h
∂δ
> 0
a− z = y − a. (4)
In equilibrium, the consumers located at either extreme of the interval describ-
ing the market covered by the monopolist must obtain no surplus.
If the monopolist charges a price p = p it obtains zero demand regardless
of its location. If the monopolist decides to cover the whole market, it will do
it efficiently locating at the market center (a = L/2) and charging a certain price
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p = p˜(L/2) (see expression (6) below) so that the indifferent consumers are located
at zero and L respectively.
For prices p ∈ (p˜(L/2), p), the monopolist leaves some consumers unattended.
In this case, for every price p there is a continuum of locations yielding the same
demand. Among these, there is always one such that the indifferent consumer x
is located at zero. We can thus, characterize demand captured by the monopolist
for every price p ∈ (p˜(L/2), p) by the set of consumers with its left bound at zero.
This in turn, implies that the feasible locations for the monopolist are a ∈ [0, L2 ).
Demand addressed to the monopolist is given by,
D(p) =
∫ a
z
(
1 + h(a− w;µ))dw + ∫ y
a
(
1 + h(w − a;µ))dw
= 2(a− z) +H(a− z;µ) +H(y − a;µ)− 2H(0;µ),
where we have made use of (4) and H(δ;µ) = ∫ h(δ;µ)dδ. From (4) it follows
H(a− x;µ) = H(y − a;µ) so that
D(p) = 2(a− z +H(a− z;µ)−H(0;µ)). (5)
The price that makes the consumer located at zero indifferent between buying
the commodity or staying out of the market is,
p˜(a) =
p
1 + h(a;µ)
. (6)
Evaluating firm’s profits at p˜(a), we obtain,
Π(a) = 2p˜(a)
(
a+H(a;µ)−H(0;µ)). (7)
Proposition 1. Under monopoly, the market will be covered if, for all a ≤ L/2,
(
1 + h(a;µ)
)2 ≥ ∂h
∂δ
(a;µ)
(
a+H(a;µ)−H(0;µ)). (8)
Proof. From (7) we derive
∂Π(a)
∂a
= 2p
(
1−
∂h
∂δ
(a;µ)(a+H(a;µ)−H(0;µ))
(1 + h(a;µ))2
)
,
that is non negative if the condition (8) holds.
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As particular cases we propose the following:
Definition 2 (Melting with Quantity and Distance: MQD). We say that melting is
MQD when it is proportional to the product of the quantity bought and the distance
traveled. Formally:
qx − µδqx = 1 (9)
and h(δ;µ) = µδ1−µδ .
Definition 3 (Melting with Distance: MD). We refer to MD melting as the situation
where the melting is proportional to a power (α) of the distance. Formally:
qx − µδα = 1 (10)
and h(δ;µ) = µδα.
Definition 4 (Samuelson Melting). Samuelson’s melting process considers a con-
stant melting rate with h(δ;µ) = eµδ − 1 and
qx = eµδ (11)
Corollary 1. (i) Under MQD, the monopolist covers the whole market and lo-
cates at its center iff L
2
≤ e− 1
eµ
(ii) Under MD, the monopolist locates at the center and covers all the market if
α ≤ 2.
(iii) Under Samuelson Melting, the monopolist locates at the center and covers
all the market.
Proof. See appendix
4 Melting in oligopolistic markets
We now extend our analysis to the case of oligopolistic markets. We intend to
illustrate the effect of the iceberg transport approach in the study of oligopoly. We
retain the same model as in the monopoly case, but now we introduce competition
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between two identical firms except for their location on the market. To ease the
illustration we restrict firms to locate symmetrically around the market center, and
we will characterize transport costs by a Samuelson-type melting function.
To be precise, we introduce first the necessary notation.
Two firms a, and b are located at points a and b = 1 − a where a ∈ [0, 1/2).
Let pa and pb denote their respective prices, and p¯ the common reservation price
for consumers. We assume p¯ to be high enough (but finite) so that all consumers
can afford purchasing from one of the firms (in other words, the market is fully
covered). Let µ = 1 in the Samuelson melting function. Then, the price paid by
a consumer located at a distance δ from firm i is given by pieδ. As δ < 1/2, the
assumption of a high enough consumers’ willingness to pay translates into
p¯ > pie
1
2 . (12)
4.1 Consumers’ decision problem
We start by characterizing the decision problem of a consumer located at a point
x ∈ [0, 1]. Such consumer would be indifferent between patronizing either firm if,
for a given price pair (pa, pb), (s)he satisfies,
pae
x−a = pbe1−a−x.
That is,
x(pa, pb) =
1
2
(
1− ln pa
pb
)
. (13)
Accordingly, demand captured by both firms is given by,
Da(pa, pb) =
∫ a
0
ea−sds+
∫ x(pa,pb)
a
es−ads = −2 + ea + e 12−a
√
pb
pa
, (14)
Db(pa, pb) =
∫ 1−a
x(pa,pb)
e1−a−sds+
∫ 1
1−a
es−1+ads = −2 + ea + e 12−a
√
pa
pb
.
(15)
Note that aggregate demand is given by,
Da(pa, pb) +Db(pa, pb) = −4 + 2ea + e
1
2
−a
(√pa
pb
+
√
pb
pa
)
.
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Figure 2: Firm i’s contingent demand.
Given the symmetry of the set up, we can focus on a generic firm i with demand
Di(pi, pj) = −2 + ea + e 12−a
√
pj
pi
Note that firm i’s market share will be positive if, given pj its price is such that
the indifferent consumer is located at x(pi, pj) ≥ 0. That is, firm i will capture
some consumers whenever it quotes a price pi ≤ pmaxi where pmaxi is defined as
the solution of x(pi, pj) = 0. Similarly, firm i will capture all the market when
quoting a price pi ≤ pmini , where pmini is the solution of x(pi, pj) = 1. Formally,
pmaxi = epj , and pmini =
pj
e
.
Figure 2 represents firm i’s contingent demand. It is continuous, decreasing in
pi and convex in [pmini , pmaxi ].
Also, given p¯, and recalling that the price paid by a consumer located at a
distance δ from the firm is given by pieδ, it follows that pieδ < p¯. As we assume
symmetric locations, it is necessary for firms to cover the market that,
pi <
p¯
ea
. (16)
From (12) and (16), and since ea is increasing in a, it follows,
p¯
pi
> max{e 12 , ea} = e 12 . (17)
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4.2 Firms’ decision problem
Firms produce their differentiated variety with a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy, common to both firms and represented by a constant marginal cost c > 0.
They aim at maximizing profits by choosing non-cooperatively their prices.
Firm i’s profits are given by,
Πi(pi, pj) = (pi − c)
(
−2 + ea + e 12−a
√
pj
pi
)
(18)
It is straightforward to compute,
∂Πi
∂pi
= −2 + ea + e 12−a
(pj
pi
) 1
2
(pi + c
2pi
)
, (19)
∂2Πi
∂p2i
= −1
4
e
1
2
−ap
1
2
j p
− 5
2
i (pi + 3c) < 0. (20)
Accordingly, firm i’s profit function is continuous and concave in [pmin, pmax].
From the inspection of the first order condition (19), it should be apparent that
this price game has a symmetric solution at pa = pb = p. Note also, that we
(implicitly) assume pi > c so that profits are well defined. In turn. this implies
from (17) that,
p¯
c
> e
1
2 , (21)
an expression that will be useful below.
4.3 Symmetric price equilibrium
The candidate symmetric price equilibrium (under full market coverage) of this
game is obtained from (19) after substituting pi by p. It is given by,
p∗(a) =
ce
1
2
−a
4− 2ea − e 12−a
. (22)
This candidate equilibrium price is well-defined only for some values of the loca-
tion parameter a. In particular, note that p∗(a) > 0 for a ∈ [0, 0.35), and p∗(a) < 0
for a ∈ (0.35, 0.5), and
lim
a→(0.35)−
p∗(a) =∞, and lim
a→(0.35)+
p∗(a) = −∞.
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Also, note that p∗(a) is increasing and convex in a and p∗(0) > c. Thus, p∗(a) is
a candidate equilibrium price only if a < 0.35. However, as we are characterizing
the equilibrium under full market coverage, we have to ensure that the most distant
consumer to the firm faces a price leaving him(her) indifferent between patronizing
the firm or staying out of the market. To identify such a price, recall that all con-
sumers have a reservation price p¯. Also, the most distant consumer to, say, firm a
is located at zero when a ≥ 1/4, and is located at 1/2 when a ≤ 1/4. Accord-
ingly, using (16), we obtain that the price at which the most distant consumer is
indifferent between buying and not buying is given by{
p¯
ea if a ≥ 14
p¯
e
1
2−a
if a ≤ 14
(23)
From (22) and (23) we obtain that the symmetric price equilibrium under mar-
ket coverage is given by,
p∗ =
min
{
ce
1
2−a
4−2ea−e 12−a
, p¯ea ,
p¯
e
1
2−a
}
if a < 0.35
p¯
ea if a ≥ 0.35
(24)
That is, as long as p∗(a) is low enough to capture the most distant consumer, the
firm follows, when a < 0.35, the profit maximizing price. However, it may happen
that for a given location of the firm, the most distant consumer finds p∗(a) too high,
so that the full price of the purchase, p∗(a)eδ (with δ = max{a, (12 − a)}), lies
above his(her) reservation price. Then, for those locations the firm will keep the
market covered charging the price given by (23). Hence, p∗ is defined as the lower
envelope of the prices given by (22) and (23).
Note that
Figure 3 summarizes the discussion. For any a ∈ [0, 12) the lower envelope is
characterized by the ratio p¯/c.
Four different configurations may arise. We can characterize them by com-
paring the values of the price functions at a = 0 and at a = 1/4. To ease the
11
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Figure 3: Symmetric equilibrium price profile
characterization, note that
p∗(0) =
c
0.213
, p∗(
1
4
) =
c
0.115
;
p¯
e
1
2
=
p¯
1.649
,
p¯
e
1
4
=
p¯
1.284
.
Accordingly,
p∗(0) >
p¯
e
1
2
⇐⇒ p¯
c
< 7.742,
p∗(
1
4
) >
p¯
e
1
4
⇐⇒ p¯
c
< 11.165.
The four cases depicted in figure 3 are characterized by,
Case (i) is described by p∗(0) > p¯
e
1
2
and p∗(14) >
p¯
e
1
4
. This implies p¯c < 7.742.
This bound is to be qualified by the argument of case (ii). There we argue
that the actual bound is p¯c ≤ 7.436. Also, in section 4.5 below, we will
identify a lower bound for p¯c given by e
1
2 . Recalling (21), Case (i) can be
described by p¯c ∈ (e
1
2 , 7.436].
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Case (ii) is fairly subtle. The curve p∗(a) crosses the curve p¯
e
1
2−a
twice. Note
that ∂p
∗(a)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=0
= 0 < p¯
e
1
2
=
∂ p¯
e
1
2−a
∂a
∣∣∣
a=0
. Accordingly, it must be the
case that p∗(0) > p¯
e
1
2
. The subtlety of the argument appears when verifying
whether both crossings occur to the left of a = 1/4, or the second crossing
occurs to the right of a = 1/4. Let us consider this latter situation first. It
means that p∗(14) <
p¯
e
1
4
. This implies p¯c < 7.742 and
p¯
c > 11.165. Thus,
this case cannot arise, and it must be the case that both crossings happen
to the left of a = 1/4. To see the intuition of this case, assume, for the
sake of the argument, that p¯ is fixed. Start with a high enough value of c.
This places us in case (i) above. Now, lowering gradually the value of c,
the curve p∗(a) shifts downwards. For some value of c both curves, p∗(a)
and p¯
e
1
2−a
will be tangent. Such tangency occurs where both slopes coincide,
yielding p¯c = 7.436. Therefore, case (ii) appears for p¯c ∈ (7.436, 7.742), and
accordingly, case (i) as stated above is characterized by p¯c ≤ 7.436.
Case (iii) is described by p∗(0) < p¯
e
1
2
and p∗(14) >
p¯
e
1
4
. Thus, p¯c ∈ (7.742, 11.165).
It is also easy to verify that p∗(0) > c.
Case (iv) is described by p∗(0) < p¯
e
1
2
and p∗(14) ≤ p¯
e
1
4
. This implies p¯c ≥ 11.165.
Thus, we have a complete characterization of the symmetric price equilibrium of
the game, summarized in the following
Proposition 2. In a duopoly model with Samuelson melting, there is a symmetric
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price equilibrium. It is characterized by
p∗ =

{
p¯
e
1
2−a
, for a ∈ [0, 14 ]
p¯
ea , for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
if p¯c ∈ (e
1
2 , 7.436]
p∗(a), for a ∈ [a˜1, a˜2]
p¯
e
1
2−a
, for a ∈ [0, a˜1] ∪ [a˜2, 14 ]
p¯
ea , for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
if p¯c ∈ (7.436, 7.742)
p∗(a), for a ∈ [0, a˜]
p¯
e
1
2−a
, for a ∈ [a˜, 14 ]
p¯
ea , for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
if p¯c ∈ [7.742, 11.165){
p∗(a), for a ∈ [0, aˆ]
p¯
ea , for a ∈ [aˆ, 12 ]
if p¯c ≥ 11.165
where a˜1, a˜2 and a˜ are the solutions of p∗(a) = p¯
e
1
2−a
in cases (ii) and (iii) respec-
tively, and aˆ is the solution of p∗(a) = p¯ea in case (iv).
Note that given p¯c , the equilibrium is unique. Also, p
∗ is defined for all a ∈
[0, 12 ], and is continuous in a, but not necessarily differentiable in all a. Accord-
ingly, demand and profit functions are also continuous in a.
4.4 Location
To study the optimal (symmetric) location of the firm, recall that price equilibrium
is characterized, given p¯c , by the lower envelope of the price functions, p
∗(a), p¯ea ,
and p¯
e
1
2−a
.
We will proceed in two steps. First, we will study the behavior of the profit
function under each of the price functions. then we will characterize the equilib-
rium location according to the scenario induced by p¯c .
4.5 Study of the profit function Π(a)
Profits of the firm are defined, as usual, as the mark-up of the equilibrium price
over the (constant) marginal cost on the demand, that is,
Π(a) = (p∗ − c)D(a) = (p∗ − c)(−2 + ea + e 12−a),
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where we have made use of (14). We want to study the behavior of this profit
function with respect to a,
dΠ(a)
da
=
dp∗
da
D(a) + (p∗ − c)dD(a)
da
,
d2Π(a)
da2
=
d2p∗
da2
D(a) + 2
dp∗
da
dD(a)
da
+ (p∗ − c)d
2D(a)
da2
,
where
dD(a)
da
= ea − e 12−a, d
2D(a)
da2
= ea + e
1
2
−a.
Lemma 1. Assume p∗ = p¯ea . Then, the profit function Π(a) is decreasing in a.
Proof. Profits are defined for a ∈ (14 , 12) as,
Π(a) =
( p¯
ea
− c
)
(−2 + ea + e 12−a).
Note that (21) ensure that profits are well-defined. As
dp∗
da
= − p¯
ea
, and d
2p∗
da2
= p¯ea,
it follows,
dΠ(a)
da
=
1
e2a
[
2p¯
(
ea − e 12
)
− c
(
e3a − e 12+a
)]
< 0
No general result can be obtained on the concavity or convexity of the profit func-
tion.
Lemma 2. Assume p∗ = p¯
e
1
2−a
. Then, the profit function Π(a) is increasing in a.
Proof. Profits are defined for a ∈ (0, 14) as,
Π(a) =
( p¯
e
1
2
−a − c
)
(−2 + ea + e 12−a),
Note that (21) ensure that profits are well-defined. As
dp∗
da
=
d2p∗
da2
=
p¯
e
1
2
−a ,
it follows,
dΠ(a)
da
= ea−
1
2
[
2p¯
(
ea − 1
)
− c
(
e
1
2 − e1−2a
)]
> 0
No general result can be obtained on the concavity or convexity of the profit func-
tion.
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Lemma 3. Assume p∗ = ce
1
2−a
4−2ea−e 12−a
. Then, Π(a) has a minimum at a¯ ≈ 0.05219266638
and is convex in a.
Proof. Profits are defined as,
Π(a) =
( ce 12−a
4− 2ea − e 12−a
− c
)
(−2 + ea + e 12−a),
where
dp∗
da
=
4ce
1
2
−a(ea − 1)(
4− 2ea − e 12−a)2
d2p∗
da2
=
−4c(4e 12−a − 6e 12 + e1−2a + 4e 12+a − 2e1−a)(
4− 2ea − e 12−a)3
Accordingly,
dΠ(a)
da
= −2c(−2 + e
a + e
1
2
−a)(6e
1
2
−a − 3e 12 − 4ea + 2e2a − e1−2a)
(4− 2ea − e 12−a)2
The first term in brackets in the numerator is always positive for a ∈ [0, 0.35]. The
second term in brackets has a root at a¯ ≈ 0.05219266638, is positive for smaller
values of a¯ and negative for larger values of a¯.
d2Π(a)
da2
=
2cΛ(a)
−(4− 2ea − e 12−a)3
> 0,
because Λ(a) < 0 ∀a ∈ (0, 0.35), where
Λ(a) = 48e
1
2
−a +24e3a +12e
3
2
−3a − 4e4a − e2−4a − 48e2a − 52e1−2a +32ea
− 21e− 96e 12 + 60e 12+a + 64e1−a − 12e 12+2a − 6e 32−2a
4.6 Location equilibrium
Once the behavior of the profit function has been fully identified, we can charac-
terize the (symmetric) location equilibrium of the game. For a given ratio p¯c , this
equilibrium is unique, as the following proposition states.
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Figure 4: Location equilibrium for p¯c ∈ (e
1
2 , 7.436)
Proposition 3. (i) Assume p¯c ∈ (e
1
2 , 11.165). Then, there is a symmetric loca-
tion equilibrium at a = 14 .
(ii) Assume p¯c ≥ 11.165. Then, there is a symmetric location equilibrium at
a = aˆ, where aˆ is the solution of p∗(a) = p¯ea
Proof. See appendix
The intuition of the proposition goes as follows:
(i) Assume p¯c ∈ (e
1
2 , 7.436). From proposition 2, lemma 1 and lemma 2, the
profit function has the shape ahown in figure 4. Accordingly, the maximum
value of the profit function is reached at a = 14 . Note that at such point, the
profit function is not differentiable.
(ii) Assume p¯c ∈ (7.436, 7.742). From proposition 2, lemma 1, lemma 2, and
lemma 3, two possible scenarios illustrated in figure 5, may arise according
to the relative positions of a˜1, a˜2 with respect to 0.052. Recall that a˜1 and a˜2
are the real solutions of p∗(a) = p¯
e
1
2−a
. Scenario 1 yields a unique maximum
at a = 14 . Scenario 2 shows two local maxima at a = a˜1 and at a =
1
4 . In
the appendix it is shown that the latter one is also a global equilibrium.
(iii) Assume p¯c ∈ [7.742, 11.165). From proposition 2, lemma 1, lemma 2, and
lemma 3, it follows that there are two possible shapes for the profit function
as shown in figure 6. In any of the two situations, the global maximum of
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a˜1 a˜2 a˜1 a˜2
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Figure 5: Location equilibrium for p¯c ∈ (7.436, 7.742)
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a˜
Figure 6: Location equilibrium for p¯c ∈ [7.742, 11.165)
the profit function is reached at a = 14 . Although at a = 0 there is a local
maximum it is clearly not global because Π(0) < Π(14) for
p¯
c > 6.702. Note
that at a = 14 , the profit function is not differentiable.
(iv) Assume p¯c ≥ 11.165. From proposition 2, lemma 2 and lemma 3, it follows
that the profit function has a local maximum at a = 0 and a global maximum
at a = aˆ. Figure 7 illustrates.
5 Conclusion.
The motivation of the proposed analysis stems from the apparent inconsistency
in the modeling of transport costs in address models of product differentiation.
In those models it is assumed that transportation is a commodity different from
the differentiated sector object of study and not included in the ‘composite good’
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Figure 7: Location equilibrium for p¯c ≥ 11.165
summarizing the rest of the economy. Methodologically, this is awkward because
transportation becomes an industry whose structure is not modeled. Who are the
agents or how transportation is provided is left unspecified. Curiously enough, this
way of modeling product differentiation is appealing because the intuitions derived
turn out to be quite useful.
We propose to solve this methodological inconsistency of the analysis by mea-
suring transportation in terms of the differentiated commodity, using the so-called
iceberg transport cost technology introduced by Von Thu¨nen in 1930 and formal-
ized by Samuelson in 1954. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the spatial
competition literature in proposing such an approach.
The iceberg formulation represents a new way of thinking in spatial competi-
tion. To make the reader familiar with it, we first illustrate its implications assum-
ing away all elements of competition. Next, we incorporate strategic interaction
with a simple symmetric duopoly model. We can characterize prize and location
competition in this new framework in terms of the ratio between the (common)
reservation price and the (constant and common) marginal production cost. Ac-
cording to this ratio, we can summarize symmetric equilibrium location decisions
in two patterns. Either firms locate at the first and third quartiles respectively, or at
points (aˆ, 1− aˆ), where aˆ ∈ (14 , 0.35).
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Appendix: Proof of Corollary 1
i) Under MQD melting we have:
∂h(δ, µ)
∂δ
=
µ
(1− µδ)2
and
H(δ, µ) =
1
µ
(−µδ − ln(1− µδ)).
Hence,
(1 + h(a, µ))2 =
1
(1− µa)2
and
∂h(a, µ)
∂δ
(a+H(a, µ)−H(0, µ)) = − ln(1− µa)
(1− µa)2 .
As ln(1− µa) < 0 and d ln(1− µa)
da
< 0, if expression (8) in Proposition 1
holds for a = L2 , it will also hold for a <
L
2 .
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Given that
1
(1− µL2 )2
>
− ln(1− µL2 )
(1− µL2 )2
⇔ e > 1
1− µL2
⇔ 2e− 1
eµ
> L,
we obtain, from Proposition 1, the result.
ii) Under MD melting we have:
∂h(δ, µ)
∂δ
= µαδα−1
and
H(δ, µ) =
µδα+1
α+ 1
.
Hence, as
(1 + h(a, µ))2 = 1 + 2µaα + µ2a2α
and
∂h(a, µ)
∂δ
(a+H(a, µ)−H(0, µ)) = αµaα + α
α+ 1
µ2a2α,
the inequality (8) in Proposition 1 holds for α ≤ 2. Accordingly, for α ≤ 2
the monopolist locates at the center and covers all the market.
iii) Under Samuelson melting we have:
∂h(δ, µ)
∂δ
= µeµδ
and
H(δ, µ) =
eµδ
µ
− δ.
Hence, given that
(1 + h(a, µ))2 = e2µa
and
∂h(a, µ)
∂δ
.(a+H(a, µ)−H(0, µ)) = e2µa − eµa,
from Proposition 1 we obtain that the monopolist locates at the center and
covers all the market. 
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
Let us define (e 12 , 11.165) = (e 12 , 7.436) ∪ [7.436, 7.742) ∪ [7.742, 11.165).
(i) Assume p¯c ∈ (e
1
2 , 7.436). This means that, from proposition 2, lemma 1 and
lemma 2,
dΠ(a)
da
{
> 0, for a ∈ [0, 14 ]
< 0, for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
Accordingly, the maximum value of the profit function is reached at a = 14 .
Note that at such point, the profit function is not differentiable.
(ii) Assume p¯c ∈ (7.436, 7.742). From proposition 2, lemma 1, lemma 2, and
lemma 3, two possible scenarios may arise according to the relative positions
of a˜1, a˜2 with respect to 0.052. Recall that a˜1 and a˜2 are the real solutions
of p∗(a) = p¯
e
1
2−a
.
Scenario 1: 0.052 < a˜1 < a˜2
dΠ(a)
da
{
> 0, for a ∈ [0, 14 ]
< 0, for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
Scenario 2: a˜1 < 0.052 < a˜2
dΠ(a)
da

> 0, for a ∈ [0, a˜1]
< 0, for a ∈ [a˜1, 0.052)
> 0, for a ∈ (0.052, 14 ]
< 0, for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
A potential third scenario characterized by a˜1 < a˜2 < 0.052 can be dis-
carded. We know that the tangency between the curves p∗(a) and p¯
e
1
2−a
occurs at a = 0.075628. Given p¯, if we lower the value of c, the curve p∗(a)
shifts downwards. Accordingly, a˜2 > 0.075628.
Scenario 1 yields a unique maximum at a = 14 . Scenario 2 shows two local
maxima at a = a˜1 and at a = 14 . The latter one is also a global equilib-
rium. Note that a˜1 and a˜2 are the intersection points of the curves, p∗(a) and
p¯
e
1
2−a
. Also, lemma 2 tells us that the maximum profit over the curve p¯
e
1
2−a
is
reached at a = 1/4. This implies that Π(a˜1) < Π(a˜2) because a˜1 < a˜2 < 14 .
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(iii) Assume p¯c ∈ [7.742, 11.165). From proposition 2, lemma 1, lemma 2, and
lemma 3, it follows that
dΠ(a)
da

< 0, for
{
a ∈ [0, 0.052] if a˜ > 0.052
a ∈ [0, a˜] if a˜ < 0.052
> 0, for
{
a ∈ [0.052, 14 ] if a˜ > 0.052
a ∈ [a˜, 14 ] if a˜ < 0.052
< 0, for a ∈ [14 , 12 ]
In any of the two situations, the maximum value of the profit function is
reached at a = 14 . Although at a = 0 there is a local maximum it is clearly
not global because Π(0) < Π(14) for
p¯
c > 6.702. Note that at a =
1
4 , the
profit function is not differentiable.
(iv) Assume p¯c ≥ 11.165. From proposition 2, lemma 2 and lemma 3, it follows
that
dΠ(a)
da

< 0, for a ∈ [0, 0.0522)
> 0, for a ∈ (00522, aˆ]
< 0, for a ∈ [aˆ, 12 ]
Accordingly, the maximum value of the profit function is reached at a = aˆ.
As in (iii) here we find again a local maximum at a = 0. However Π(0) <
Π(aˆ) because( c
0.213
− c)(−2 + 1 + e 12 ) < ( p
eaˆ
− c)(−2 + eaˆ + e 12−aˆ)
where
p
eaˆ
=
ce
1
2
−aˆ
4− 2eaˆ − e 12−aˆ
,
can be simplified to
(−2 + eaˆ + e 12−aˆ)2
4− 2eaˆ − e 12−aˆ
> 1.198
The fraction on the left-hand side is increasing and convex in a ∈ (14 , 0.35).
Therefore, it has a minimum value of
(−2 + e 14 + e 14 )2
4− 2e 14 − e 14
= 2.181.
Hence, it follows that the profit function reaches its global maximum at a =
aˆ. Note that at such point, the profit function is not differentiable. 
23
